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Vain creatures that we are, most of us hope to be grieved after our deaths. To 
learn that our loved ones will not grieve for us or that their anguish will subside 
quickly might imply something unsettling about ourselves: that we really do 
not matter as much to others as we ordinarily suppose.
Empirical studies of grief indicate that these egoistic hopes often go un-
realized, however. Far from being permanent, the pains of grief, while often 
initially intense, tend to dissipate in a few months, rather than years. In the 
immediate aftermath of a spouse or loved one’s death, grief is nearly always 
detrimental to subjective well-being. Yet most individuals return to their an-
tecedent level of well-being surprisingly quickly. Our apparent ability to move 
on, or move beyond grief, seems to indicate that our “emotional immune sys-
tem” deals with the pain of loss with far more resilience than we might expect.1
In a well-regarded article, Dan Moller has argued that these empirical find-
ings do not show that we fail to care (or care very little) about our loved ones 
while they are alive. However, such findings give us reason to regret our appar-
ent resilience in the face of grief, according to Moller.2 Because our emotions 
enable us to “perceive value,” our apparent ability to adapt to the loss of our 
loved ones suggests that we eventually end up blind to the value of our loved 
ones and our relationships with them, he argues. We should thus regret this re-
silience on epistemic grounds, inasmuch as it precludes emotional engagement 
with our lost loved ones and “so deprives us of insight into our own condition.”3
1 George Bonnano summarizes the empirical findings regarding grief and ‘recovery’ in Chapter 
4 of The Other Side of Sadness: What the New Science of Bereavement Tells Us about Life After 
Loss (Basic Books, 2009).
2 “Love and death,” Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 301–316. For other discussions of this ar-
ticle, see Aaron Smuts, “Love and death: The problem of resilience,” in M. Cholbi (ed.), Im-
mortality and the Philosophy of Death (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 173–188, and Ryan 
Preston-Roedder and Erica Preston-Roedder, “Grief and recovery,” in A. Gotlib, ed. The Moral 
Psychology of Sadness (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, forthcoming).
3 “Love and death,” p. 311.
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Moller’s conclusion is, I shall argue, correct in broad outline. Yet he reaches 
this conclusion without reference to any larger theoretical framework con-
cerning grief ’s nature or its normative significance to our lives. My goals in 
this article are to provide such a framework and to thereby offer a theoretically 
richer vindication of Moller’s conclusion. I intend this framework to be largely 
neutral, however, among philosophical theories of the emotions. The conclu-
sions I reach regarding the nature and significance of grief are ones that should 
be acceptable to those who hold that emotions are feelings or awarenesses 
of bodily states, judgments, or cognitions of value, etc. Nevertheless, Moller’s 
suggestion that grief is an emotional perception will serve as a useful platform 
by which to defend three claims that, I shall demonstrate, are central to the 
nature of grief. First, grief is not a single ‘perceptual’ affective state but an emo-
tional process; second, grief registers the value of deceased loved ones by at-
tending to that value over time rather than perceiving that value all at once; 
and third, grief is not a passive state of emotional receptivity but an activity 
driven by the goal of placing the bereaved’s relationship with the deceased 
on new terms. Having defended these three claims regarding grief ’s nature, I 
then turn to the question of whether the characteristic resilience we show in 
the face of grief merits regret. I argue that, because the suffering or anguish we 
associate with grief is only one element of our normatively significant emo-
tional engagement with a deceased person, the cessation of this suffering or 
anguish does not exhaust the considerations relevant to determining whether 
this cessation merits regret. More specifically, the onset (and abatement) of 
this suffering must instead be evaluated with respect to its role in achieving 
a good for which grief represents an especially fruitful opportunity, namely 
self-knowledge or self-understanding. And because grief is an activity rather 
than a perception, the regret at issue turns out to be species of what Bernard 
Williams called agent-regret, rather than spectator-regret. We can, therefore, 
fail ourselves by failing to grieve well.
1 Grief as a Process of Emotional Attention
On one level, empirical findings indicating our resilience in the face of grief 
may be encouraging. We grieve less than we might predict, and insofar as grief 
is an unpleasant experience, that we so readily adapt to such losses may be 
good for us overall. Nevertheless, that our grief is more short lived or moderate 
than we anticipate may seem to be grounds for distress or regret. Moller pro-
poses that such resilience may justify distress or regret because our emotions 
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enable us to track or register what is valuable to us. That we are unexpectedly 
resilient in the face of loss—that the suffering of grief fades more fully and 
more quickly than we would predict—thus implies that we become epistemi-
cally severed from our deceased loved ones. “Our response over time” to the 
loss of a loved one “does not seem to reflect the preciousness” that loved one 
has to us, according to Moller. We are thereby immediately deprived of an ap-
preciation of their significance to us and ultimately deprived of “insight into 
our own condition.”
I broadly agree with Moller’s premise that emotional states track value and 
with his conclusion that “insight into our own condition” is normatively at 
stake in grief. But his general line of argument benefits from being situated 
in a more detailed theoretical account of grief ’s nature and significance than 
Moller advances.
Grief registers a state of affairs that is evaluatively significant to the be-
reaved. We shall have occasion later to say more precisely what that state of 
affairs is, but for now, less us simply say that grief registers a loss of some kind. 
But how does grief register a loss to the bereaved? While the vast majority of 
philosophers agree that emotions in some manner register evaluatively sig-
nificant states of affairs, they differ as to what is essential in explaining this 
relation. I do not aim to settle such disputes here. Rather, I use as my launch-
ing point Moller’s suggestion that because emotions are “part of the means by 
which we perceive value,”4 grief registers loss via a perception of that loss. I do 
so largely for expository convenience rather than from any bias in favor of a 
‘perceptual’ theory of emotions.
It is difficult to know how to interpret the claim that emotions are ‘percep-
tions’ of evaluatively significant states of affairs. Are we to take this claim liter-
ally, so that just as visual phenomena are perceptions of observable properties 
such as size or shape, emotions are perceptions of normative properties such 
as (say) dangerousness or lovability? Or is the perceptual language here more 
metaphorical? For our purposes, the metaphysical specifics of emotional per-
ception can be set aside so as to focus on the epistemic connotations of the 
thesis that emotions are perceptions of value. If emotions are perceptions of 
value, then to be in a particular emotional state provides reasons related to the 
facts the state ‘perceives.’ To hear the sizzle of water is to be in a state that gives 
the hearer an immediate or non-inferential reason to believe that the kettle 
on the stove has overflowed. Similarly, to feel (say) fear is to be in a state that 
gives the experiencer an immediate or non-inferential reason to believe that 
something in her environment is threatening to her or to what she cares about. 
4 “Love and death,” p. 311, emphasis added.
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In both cases, facts in the world casually elicit ‘perceptions’ in individuals that 
generate accurate but defeasible attitudes about those facts.
Applied to grief, this model implies that grief is a perception of loss, a feel-
ing directed at, and elicited by awareness of, that loss. In feeling grief, a person 
acquires a reason (or additional reason) to form further beliefs or attitudes 
related to that loss.
No doubt grief involves perceptions of loss. But this model underdescribes 
the emotional complexity of grief. While we sometimes use ‘grief ’ to denote 
only the sadness associated with grieving, grief does not seem like a percep-
tion, a single sensation-like state directed at the world. Rather, grief involves a 
concatenation of emotional states or perceptions. Thanks largely to the work 
of Elizabeth Kubler-Ross and John Bowlby, grief is now recognized as a process 
with delineable stages.5 Grief qua process will include moments of suffering. 
Yet it will also include other emotional states. What has come to be seen as 
the Kubler-Ross ‘theory’—that those who grieve proceed through a five-stage 
process of denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance—is incorrect. 
Very few instances of grief conform to this process.6 Nevertheless, as many 
philosophers have concluded, grief cannot be straightforwardly modeled on 
emotions like fear or anger because grief is not a single mental event or epi-
sode. Rather, the process of grief involves a series of emotional conditions or 
events. As Wittgenstein remarked,7 while it is coherent to utter “For a moment 
I felt intense pain,” to utter “For a moment I felt intense grief” is discursively 
amiss precisely because it reports one’s grief as if it were a momentary sensa-
tion. Suffering is no doubt an essential constituent of grief. But it should not 
be identified with grief.
Thus, if grief is perception-like in giving us reasons to form attitudes about 
the loss that elicits it, then because grief nearly always involves multiple 
‘perceptions’ of different emotional kinds, grief seems to give us reasons to 
form many attitudes about that loss. A grief episode containing (say) sadness, 
anger, and anxiety gives us reason to form several attitudes concerning its 
object. Grief is therefore not as epistemically well-behaved as most other 
5 On Death and Dying (New York: Scribner, 1997), Loss: Sadness and Depression (New York: 
Basic Books, 1982).
6 See Paul K. Maciejewski, Baohui Zhang, Susan D. Block, and Holly G. Prigerson, “An empiri-
cal examination of the stage theory of grief,” Journal of the American Medical Association 297 
(2007): 716–723 (popularly known as the “Yale bereavement study”), and Ruth Davis Konigs-
berg, The Truth about Grief: The Myth of Its Five Stages and the New Science of Loss (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2011).
7 Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), pp. 174–75.
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emotions; rather than instantiating a one-to-one relation, wherein a given fact 
F elicits perception P, grief ’s characteristic pattern is that a given fact F (or a 
complex set of facts F) elicits multiple emotional perceptions. This affective 
many-sidededness of grief further suggests that its object is more normatively 
complex than other emotions. (More on this to come.)
There is a second sense in which describing grief as a perception may mis-
lead. Our emotional perceptions can depend on background beliefs and dis-
positions, some of which are irrational. Phobias, for instance, lead us to fear 
what does not merit fear. But standardly, when emotions provide us evidence 
concerning the normative significance of various facts, they do so in a rela-
tively decisive way. That the thunder clap causes fear is compelling evidence of 
the storm’s dangerousness; that the insult causes anger is compelling evidence 
of its utterer being unkind; etc. And often, emotions dissipate as their objects 
dissipate. Our fear abates as the storm ends, our anger softens once the utterer 
apologizes, etc.
Grief, in contrast, does not so much settle the question of the normative sig-
nificance of its object as it does invite further engagement with it. Despite the 
painfulness of grief, we are often drawn to grieve, finding even grief ’s sufferings 
inexplicably attractive. St. Augustine described the grief he felt upon the death 
of a childhood friend thusly:
My heart was black with grief. Whatever I looked upon had the air of 
death. My native place was a prison-house and my home a strange un-
happiness. The things we had done together became sheer torment with-
out him. My eyes were restless looking for him, but he was not there. I 
hated all places because he was not in them. . . . I had no delight but in 
tears, for tears had taken the place my friend had held in the love of my 
heart.8
Augustine searches plaintively for his friend but finds ‘delight’ in that tearful 
search. Unlike other emotions, his grief did not provide him a part representa-
tion of the normative significance of his friend’s death. His grief instead mo-
tivates further interrogation of, or engagement with, an object that Augustine 
cognizes only dimly.
Augustine’s account of his own grief underscores how the process of grief 
functions evaluatively more as a form of temporally extended attention to 
some fact rather than a complete and decisive perception of that fact. Michael 
8 Confessions, F. Sheed, trans., and M.P. Foley, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006) [original com-
position ad 397–400], pp. 59–60.
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Brady has recently defended an account of the nature of emotion along these 
lines. On his account, emotional experiences begin with automatic and largely 
haphazard evaluative appraisals of facts. But such experiences are signals that 
some fact requires our attention, and unlike standard perceptual experiences, 
which generally silence justificatory questions about the nature of the facts 
that are their objects, emotional experiences often raise the question of the 
nature or significance of the facts that are their objects. Emotional experiences 
thus motivate us to attend to these facts so as to inquire further into their na-
ture or significance, thereby instigating rather than terminating inquiry into 
their objects. As Brady describes it, emotions come to “capture and consume” 
our attention. This sustained attention provides us the opportunity to revise 
and correct our initial evaluative appraisals so as to align our responses with 
the objective evaluative properties of the facts that prompted those initial 
appraisals. Emotions thus relate to value not as authoritative perceptions of 
evaluative facts but as states that direct us to attend to, and subsequently size 
up, the evaluative facts that causally elicit them.9
As Brady observes, emotions are often immediate but then unfold or change 
form gradually. Such appears to be the case with grief. The various stages of 
grief, suffering included, have a common cause. That cause is more evaluative-
ly complex than are the causes of many emotions. More will be said in sec-
tion 2 about whom and what we grieve for. For the moment though, it suffices 
to observe that our relationships to those we grieve are often multifaceted. For 
example, it would be unlikely for a parent’s death to have only one kind of 
evaluative significance for a child or to conform to a simple stimulus-response 
script. For during our lifetimes, our relationships to our parents undergo many 
oscillations and transformations. The toddler who rages at her parent one 
moment coos happily the next. The sullen teenager who resents her parents’ 
heavy-handed discipline later comes to appreciate the positive effects of that 
discipline and thus admires their steadfastness. The adult child who can enjoy 
his parents’ company as if they are peers must later confront a dying and in-
tensely vulnerable parent. It would be surprising then for children to react to 
their parents’ death with a single, unalloyed emotional response.
Note that because grief adheres to the attentional model of emotion es-
poused by Brady, the various mental states or conditions that comprise a grief 
episode are not simply unrelated items temporally bundled together. The com-
ponents of this bundle are dictated by the normatively significant natural and 
social facts that surround a grief episode. These facts may include the existing 
9 Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 87–97.
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emotional dispositions of the bereaved (his emotional ‘personality’), the na-
ture of the attachment between the bereaved and the deceased, the bereaved’s 
value commitments, prior grief experiences, the circumstances surrounding 
the death, and other concurrent stresses.10 These facts in turn generate the 
structured complex of emotional states that constitute an episode of grief. The 
affective states that occur earlier in the grief process are likely to be the prod-
ucts of reflexive emotional mechanisms, whereas the latter states may be more 
reflective, as the other’s death comes to fully ‘sink in.’ This is not to suggest that 
the later emotional stages are necessarily more accurate evaluative appraisals 
of the facts that prompt grief. The stages of grief need not be teleologically or-
dered and none of these stages need be epistemically privileged, for they work 
in concert to depict our relationship with the deceased. But grief often has an 
emotional cadence, a sequence of emotional arousals and resolutions of its 
own.11 Hence, the order in which the various episodes that constitute grief oc-
cur can matter to what grief is like.
Some further hypothesize that grief processes are structured in the form of 
narratives.12 On this picture, the identity conditions for a grief episode include 
not only the bereaved, the object of her grief, and the emotional states that 
serve as the components of the grief process, but also the temporal and narra-
tive interrelations among those states. A narrative is a sequenced set of actions 
and reactions. ‘Juliet stabs herself ’ would be a very different narrative element 
had it occurred before ‘Romeo drinks the poison.’ The elements of a narrative 
constitute the narrative, but the overall narrative assigns the elements their 
respective roles. To assert that grief episodes are narratives is to claim that an 
episode with the pattern anger-apathy-sadness-acceptance is a crucially dif-
ferent episode than one containing the same component states but ordered 
differently in time, say, sadness-anger-apathy-acceptance. These patterns thus 
10 J. William Worden, Grief Counselling and Grief Therapy: A Handbook for the Mental Health 
Practitioner, 4th edition (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 57–75. Daniel C. Russell, Happiness 
for Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 218–25 summarizes many of the 
main research findings in this area. See also Michael Cholbi, “Grief ’s rationality, backward 
and forward,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2017): 255–272, doi: 10.1111/
phpr.12353.
11 David Velleman, “Narrative explanation,” Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 1–25.
12 Robert Solomon, True to Our Feelings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; 
Peter Goldie, “Grief: A narrative account,” Ratio 24 (2011): 119–137; Kathleen Marie Hig-
gins, “Love and death,” in J. Deigh (ed.), On Emotions: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 159–178; and Line Ryberg Ingerslev, “Ongoing: On grief ’s open-
ended rehearsal,” Continental Philosophy Review, forthcoming [https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/s11007-017-9423-7], doi: doi.org/10.1007/s11007-017-9423-7.
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take on a narrative quality in that the temporal order of these emotional states 
contributes to the evaluative significance of the states themselves.
As we shall see later on, I hold that grief often plays a role in the narratives of 
our lives overall. Furthermore, inasmuch as grief is a state of ongoing attention 
to some normatively significant fact(s), it often resembles narratives in being 
an effort to make sense of normatively significant facts. Grief experiences (and 
again I have in mind the totality of emotional states that constitute the grief 
process, not just the suffering) are not given to us as normatively transparent 
packages with clearly delineated parts and pre-established meanings. Indeed, 
the evaluative opacity of grief—that its importance and the importance of 
the loss it registers is not obvious to us—is why grief is less a perception of 
value than an ongoing attention to facts whose significance is not necessarily 
readily apparent to us: When in grief, we attend to its object with an inchoate 
grasp of the significance of that object. We human beings are deeply drawn to 
narrative as a way of ascribing meaning to sequences of events (witness the 
countless human origin stories and cosmologies documented by anthropolo-
gists, or our susceptibility to fallacious post hoc reasoning), and when a series 
of emotional states occur in temporal proximity to one another and have a 
common causal origin, narrating them is a natural and coherent method of 
organizing them. Hence, grief episodes are clearly amenable to narration. It 
is therefore unsurprising that bereaved persons often attempt to ‘tell a story’ 
about a deceased person and their importance to their lives such that narrative 
coherence emerges out of grief.
But I am more hesitant to conclude that grief episodes themselves are nar-
ratives. For one, grief differs from many narratives in that its components can-
not just be fabricated out of whole cloth. When grieving, we cannot just ‘make 
up’ whatever elements we wish, in the way that a novelist or playwright has a 
free hand to introduce characters, plot twists, new settings, and the like. We do 
not choose the emotional states that strike us during bereavement, nor do we 
exert much control over their temporal order. So to the degree grief episodes 
resemble narratives, they are highly constrained in comparison to other nar-
ratives we fashion.
Furthermore, narratives have a repertoire of standard components: begin-
nings and endings, conflicts, climaxes, and resolutions, etc. Locating these 
components within grief episodes can be difficult, however. Grief responds to 
the death of another, but it can also be ‘anticipatory’, i.e., occur in the expec-
tation of a person’s future death. And as many clinical accounts attest, grief 
that seems to have concluded can often recur as events unexpectedly remind 
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us of the deceased.13 Grief can also have several critical junctures or climaxes 
instead of just one. And while grief often ‘resolves’ in the quasi-clinical sense 
that it diminishes or reaches stasis, its resolution is not obviously a narrative 
resolution, since that would imply that grief episodes include a central prob-
lem to be resolved. Grief thus seems to have a structure but no clear ‘plot’ to 
lend it a narrative quality.
At any rate, that grief is a process of emotional attention rather than a uni-
tary perception suggests that the suffering inherent in grief bears normative 
relations to the other component emotions involved in grief. Our ‘resilience,’ 
that is, the diminution of the suffering triggered by this loss, is not the entirety 
of, or the conclusion of, our ethical engagement with the deaths of our loved 
ones. The presence or absence of this suffering thus cannot provide the full 
measure of grief ’s normative significance for us. We cannot, in other words, 
extract grief ’s suffering, examine its duration and intensity, and thereby infer 
whether we ought to regret being more resilient in the face of others’ deaths 
than we expect. For in doing so, the sufferings of grief are removed from the 
larger emotional context manifest in the grief process, a context that both 
provides not only additional information about the nature of the object of 
grief but information that may prove relevant to understanding that suffering. 
Whether this resilience merits regret can only be appraised via a fuller grasp of 
what it is that we attend to through the duration of a grief episode.
2 Grief’s Object
The previous section argued that insofar as any perceptual model of grief rep-
resents it as a single emotional state governed by straightforward relations of 
stimulus and response, it gets the response wrong. But there are also grounds 
for thinking that this model falls short of capturing the stimulus responsible 
for grief as well.
Brady’s attentional model suggests that the various emotional stages that 
constitute grief are all ways of attending to some states of affairs. But what is 
the fact that serves as grief ’s object? More specifically, in what sense are the 
component affective states of bereavement—anger, sadness, joy, what have 
you—all about the same fact? To this point, we have spoken generically, and 
perhaps tritely, of this object as a loss. But what is ‘lost’ here, and more pre-
cisely, given that grief is a process in which we emotionally attend to the sig-
nificance of another’s death instead of a single perceptual event that reveals 
13 Worden, Grief Counselling and Grief Therapy, pp. 140–42.
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that significance, what is the ‘lost’ object that unifies the several stages of this 
attention?
First, we need not deny that we often feel acute sorrow for what the de-
ceased lose by dying. We may empathize with the plight of those who die pre-
maturely, before various of their projects or goals can be realized. However, 
the losses suffered by the deceased are not the object of grief. For one, some 
individuals may benefit from dying, and yet their deaths (rightly) prompt grief. 
Furthermore, many people presumably suffer such a loss, but our grief does 
not extend to all of them. Any morally sensitive person is troubled and pained 
to learn of the thousands or millions of lives snuffed out in genocides or wars. 
But this sorrow is neither immediate nor fine-grained enough to count as grief.
As a matter of fact, we do not (and I suspect, probably cannot) grieve the 
deaths of all. Grief is egocentric at heart. We grieve for those with whom we 
are somehow personally entangled. It is therefore tempting to adopt a straight-
forward welfarist account of grief ’s object: that the loss in question is that of 
the various goods the deceased person provided to the bereaved. Martha Nuss-
baum rightly emphasizes that we grieve only those on whom we rely as con-
tributors to our flourishing.14 But this would imply that grief should diminish, 
or perhaps should not occur at all, if we could simply replace these goods by 
(say) identifying another individual to provide them. Yet as Moller notes,15 we 
grieve for those individuals who have become irreplaceable to us. It is this very 
irreplaceability that makes Seneca’s analogy between a deceased friend and a 
stolen tunic so chilling: “If a man who has lost his one and only tunic through 
robbery chooses to bewail his plight rather than look about him for some way 
to escape the cold, or for something to cover his shoulders, would you not 
think him an utter fool?”16 Moreover, we also grieve those whose contributions 
to our own well-being ended long ago, or even those whom we hoped would 
contribute to our well-being but failed us in that regard (children grieve abu-
sive or neglectful parents, spouses grieve those with whom they had unhappy 
marriages, etc.). Grief thus seems prompted by the deaths of those in whom 
we have invested our eudaimonic hopes rather than in the deaths of those who 
in fact have contributed to our well-being. As we shall detail later in this sec-
tion, grief can feel like an upending of one’s normative outlook on the world, 
precisely because those for whom we grieve are those around whom we have 
constructed our normative expectations for how we hope our lives will go. 
So understood, the personal entanglement requisite for grief is ethical, not 
14 Upheavals of Thought, pp. 81–82.
15 “Love and death,” pp. 309–10.
16 Epistulae Morales 63, Grummere, trans.
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metaphysical. Genuine grief at the deaths of those with whom we share no 
intimacies (admired political leaders or artists, say) is possible because what 
they do or have done is perceived as enmeshed with what we desire for our-
selves (or for the world at large).
Still, to know whom we grieve for still does not tell us precisely what we 
grieve for. C.S. Lewis’ A Grief Observed is perhaps the most poignant of phil-
osophical memoirs about grief. Lewis’ own grief at the death of his wife Joy 
helps bring the proper object of grief into view. Grief, he writes,
follows marriage as normally as marriage follows courtship or autumn 
follows summer. It is not a truncation of the process but one of its phases; 
not the interruption of the dance but the next figure.17
Lewis depicts grief not as marking the cessation of an intimate relationship 
but as a transition within it. His insight seems correct: Because death cuts 
short many salient facts about those we love, facts that determine the possible 
ways of relating to them, our relationship with the deceased ought to change 
accordingly.18 Indeed, much of the change necessitated by the deaths of those 
we grieve for arises from asymmetries between us: Our relationship to a de-
ceased person is no longer a relationship to a peer or equal. We cannot relate 
to a disembodied, silent person as we relate to a fully corporeal one. We cannot 
relate to a person with little if any agency in the world as we do to a full-blown 
practical agent. We cannot relate to a person who, rather than their things go-
ing well or badly for them at a given time, is not a subject of welfare at all. We 
may be able to forgive them but they are unable to forgive us. We can no longer 
act in concert with, or as a single body with, the deceased so as to manifest 
what Margaret Gilbert has called “joint commitments.”19 And so on.
The death of someone in whom we are eudaimonically invested is there-
fore, to a greater or lesser degree, a catalyst for a crisis in our relationship with 
them. And as we grieve, our emotional states shift, directed at different aspects 
of the relationship we had (or hoped to have had) with the deceased.
The intentional object of grief (and I mean here the object of the various 
emotional states that constitute a grief episode) is a ‘loss’ of a kind, but is 
17 (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 58.
18 See S.M. Andersen, and S. Chen, “The relational self: An interpersonal social-cognitive 
theory,’ Psychological Review, 109 (2002), 619–45; Ester Shapiro, Grief as a Family Process: A 
Developmental Approach to Clinical Practice (New York: Guilford, 1994); and Tony Walter, 
“A new model of grief: Bereavement and biography,” Mortality 1 (1996): 7–25.
19 Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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better described as a forced transition, a shift or modification in how we can 
and should relate to the deceased. Grief ’s object – what it is we grieve for as 
we experience anger, apathy, fear, etc.—is the loss of the relationship with the 
deceased as it was (where this also includes hopes or expectations as to how it 
might have been). What “captures and consumes” our attention as we grieve is 
this very change.
3 The Activity of Grieving
Thus far, we have argued for two principal conclusions regarding the nature 
of grief: First, grief episodes are emotional composites, multistate processes 
rather than singular, sensation-like perceptions. Second, grief ’s relation to its 
object is attentional, and more specifically, the particular affective states that 
constitute a grief episode are directed at different aspects of the grieving per-
son’s relationship with the deceased and are collectively directed at the trans-
formation in one’s relationship with the deceased that death necessitates.
The conclusions of the previous section point toward a third principal con-
clusion regarding the nature of grief. As we have noted, grief is less a species 
of emotional perception than of emotional attention. For practically ratio-
nal creatures like ourselves, attention will nearly always be organized around 
some task. When we direct emotionally laden attention to some state of affairs, 
returning to it periodically over time, our attention tends to acquire a point or 
purpose. Attention that has no larger aim—attention to some fact for its own 
sake—is not conceptually incoherent. But our emotionally attending to some 
fact typically reflects a budding normative investment on our part. When, for 
example, the fan of an athlete or team watches their performances, her engage-
ment and anticipation seem to have a point or purpose (in this case, to experi-
ence both the pleasures and pains of identifying with others’ efforts to succeed 
in their chosen endeavor). Or when the family members of a murder victim 
attend the trial of the accused, their attendance is a form of emotional atten-
tion directed (presumably) at wanting to know the precise fate of their family 
member and that justice has been done. To emotionally attend to some state of 
affairs over time is therefore not simply to undergo a set of passive mental epi-
sodes. Rather, emotional attention is pregnant with activity. At some point in 
an arc of sustained emotional attention, our attention transitions from passive 
to active as we begin to pay attention to the relevant state of affairs. Attending 
emotionally becomes an exercise of our agency with a point or purpose that 
we can in principle identify and articulate.
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So too, I suggest, for grief. Grief is a purpose-driven activity wherein our 
emotional attention to the death of another has a point. But toward what point 
or purpose do we grieve?
As we saw in the last section, grief ’s emotional complexity mirrors the com-
plexity of its object. Grief has a stage-like structure with distinguishable af-
fective components because while another’s death is the immediate cause of 
grief, its object—that common fact or state of affairs that unites these affec-
tive components and explains how they are components of a single emotional 
process—is the transformed relationship with the now deceased individual. 
And as we also observed in the previous section, others’ deaths foreclose many 
of the possible trajectories for our relationships with them. The deceased there-
fore bequeath to us a predicament, namely how to continue a relationship that 
cannot proceed on precisely the same terms as before. But for beings whose 
self-understandings are predicated to a large degree on our relationships with 
others, the deaths of others in whom we have invested our well-being com-
pel re-examination of the trajectories of those relationships. As authors of our 
autobiographies, the deaths of these others force authorial choices upon us 
about how our relationships with them shall continue (given that they cannot 
continue on their former terms). The process of grief, I propose, is our attempt 
to resolve this predicament.
As an activity, grief is thus grounded in our efforts to identify how, if at all, 
our relationship with the deceased will continue in light of the radical change 
in background realities that their death has wrought. This task is responsible 
for the emotional grip that grieving can have for us. Our emotional attention 
is drawn to the deceased individual because we are, however inchoately, at-
tempting to ascertain how we can and will relate to her now and in the future.
Some may doubt that grief is so purposeful as I have suggested. But it is 
crucial that my claim not be overstated. As a species of emotional attention, 
grief is not a passive enterprise. As noted above, we cannot dictate how our be-
reavement will unfold. Nevertheless, we are not powerless in bereavement ei-
ther. The choices individuals make stemming from grief (for example, choices 
about how to memorialize the deceased, what is to be done with her belong-
ings, etc.) are, I propose, oriented around the task of determining the trajectory 
of our relationship with her.
The activity of grief will often be one we pursue without explicit knowledge 
of our pursuing it. Individuals (such as Augustine) will be drawn to grieve, and 
hence drawn to emotionally attend to their relationship with the deceased, in 
order to ascertain how to relate to the deceased going forward but not necessar-
ily by acting under any generic description of this sort. Discrepancies between 
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our explicit understandings of our actions and the larger tasks or purposes of 
which those actions are parts are common. The sports fan does not set aside 
time to watch her favorite team consciously entertaining the thought that her 
choice is part of a larger pattern of emotional attention. Activities laden with 
emotional attention often become habitual or automatic, so it should not be 
surprising that we frequently engage in them with only tacit knowledge of the 
point or purpose served by our doing so.
This discrepancy between an activity’s purpose and our understanding of 
our own actions and choices is greatest in the phenomenon we might call qua-
si-grief. We quasi-grieve when we respond to the death of another with one or 
more of the phenomenological features of grief—distress and the like—but 
fail to direct attention at what I have argued is grief ’s object, the relationship 
transformed by the death of the deceased. Quasi-grief can arise when grief 
attends to some other object or when grief fails to attend to any object at all. 
The latter is likely to occur among those who seek to suppress grief by means 
of distraction or denial. The former is likely to occur in the early throes of grief 
when the fact of another’s death is a source of emotional disorientation potent 
enough that grief ’s object cannot yet come into proper view. In quasi-bereave-
ment, grief reactions are caused by grief ’s object but do not have that object 
fully in view. This may seem a strange possibility, but it is not. Intentional states 
are not necessarily transparent, and the affect associated with an intentional 
state directed at a given object can mimic the affect associated with a second 
intentional state directed at another object. In periods of emotional tumult, 
our self-understanding is likely to be especially susceptible to such misdirec-
tion, so that grief is likely to be a phase in which our recognition of its object is 
halting, gradual, or incomplete. For those in quasi-grief, grief is happening to 
them, but they are not yet grieving.
4 Practical Identities and Self-Knowledge
Let us make our way back to Moller’s question of whether, in light of these 
claims regarding the nature of grief, the resilience we unexpectedly show in 
grief merits regret. Unsurprisingly, this question is less straightforward than 
it appears. For if grief is not a simple perception of another’s value or signifi-
cance to us but an ongoing activity prompted by another’s death and oriented 
toward the relationship necessarily transformed by that death, then the ques-
tion that should concern us is not whether we should regret the abeyance of 
grief ’s suffering. Rather, our question is whether there can be rational grounds 
AQ1
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for regretting how a grief process unfolds as a whole. I shall argue that there 
can be, precisely because, as he states, we can grieve in ways that “deprive… us 
of insight into our own condition.” Fortunately though, grief is also particularly 
well-suited both to motivate and enable insight into our own condition.
We have established that the object of grief, that to which the emotional 
stages of grief attend, is the relationship transformed by the other’s death. 
Grief is thus the manifestation of a ‘relationship crisis’ instigated by the death 
of one of the relationship’s members. However, because of the nature of the 
relations we bear to those we grieve, this relationship crisis has an egocentric, 
identity-based face. Many bereaved people report a sense of disorientation, of 
not feeling at home in the world or in their own skins. Oftentimes, grieving per-
sons undergo alienation or a loss of self-recognition,20 sometimes described 
in physical terms akin to amputation.21 “I feel like I’ve lost a part of myself,” 
many bereaved persons say. This claim is true in one sense: As social animals, 
our own natures are individuated to a large degree by our relationships with 
others. And except in the rarest cases of alienation, our concerns and commit-
ments depend on the existence of others in whom our eudaimonic hopes have 
been invested. “When someone dies,” Colin Parkes observes, “a whole set of as-
sumptions about the world that relied upon the other person for their validity 
are suddenly invalidated.”22
Grief thus raises questions of self-identity and self-definition in especially 
acute ways. The relationship crisis found in grief is therefore simultaneously 
a crisis in practical identity, that description under which we value ourselves 
and take ourselves to have reasons to act as we do.23 We suffer in grief in part 
because another’s death poses a threat to our practical identities. In the case of 
grief, the threat is not literal or physical but ethical or normative.24 The death 
of someone in whom our eudaimonic hopes are invested jostles our practical 
identity. Our sense of our own projects and commitments is shaken, not in 
the sense that we necessarily come to doubt those projects and commitments 
20 James Morey (1995) Living with Grief and Mourning (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1995) and Colin Parkes and Holly Prigerson, Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult 
Life. 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010).
21 Lewis, A Grief Observed, p. 86. See Matthew Ratcliffe, “Grief and phantom limbs: A phe-
nomenological comparison,” unpublished ms. [https://www.academia.edu/31530074/
Grief_and_Phantom_Limbs_a_Phenomenological_Comparison], accessed Aug 26, 2017.
22 Bereavement: Studies of Grief in Adult Life (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 90.
23 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 101.
24 Though it should not be surprising that grief can often have physical ‘symptoms’ as well, 
including digestive difficulty, fatigue, muscle aches, etc.
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(though that can be an upshot of grief). The other’s death is instead akin to 
hearing the creak of floorboards in an aging building. The creak is not neces-
sarily a sign the building should be torn down. But it reminds us that in de-
pending upon that structure, we depend upon something vulnerable to age, 
time, and deterioration. To the extent our practical identities are metaphysi-
cally and normatively entangled with others, those others’ deaths bring the 
vulnerability, and ultimate contingency, of our practical identities into stark 
relief.25
When we engage fully with grief, we engage with the contingency of the 
material facts on which our ongoing normative commitments depend. By be-
ing compelled to bring one’s relationship with the deceased into the emotional 
spotlight, grief likewise compels us to bring our practical identities into the 
emotional spotlight as well— to subject them to normative articulation, scru-
tiny, ratification, or revision. Grief thus represents a unique opportunity for 
what Quassim Cassam has called “substantial self-knowledge,” knowledge of 
our “values, emotions, abilities, and of what makes one happy.”26 In undergo-
ing joy, anxiety, anger, etc., as stages in a grief process, we are afforded an op-
portunity to catalog or take stock of the fundamental cares or concerns around 
which we organize our lives. For example, suppose a child experiences the 
death of a parent whom the child consciously emulated, even choosing to en-
ter the parent’s chosen profession (medicine, say). The parent’s death will likely 
underscore to the child both the parent’s role in leading her to choose a medi-
cal career and the contingency of that choice. And it is when we recall that our 
practical identities are to some degree chosen rather than fated that we tend 
to interrogate them. In this case, that interrogation could have several differ-
ent results. The child may end up questioning her choice on the grounds that 
opting for medicine was an attempt to win the approval of a parent whose ap-
proval she can no longer seek. Or the child may come to see that medicine was 
a wise choice despite its being so motivated – a fortuitous decision made on 
regrettable grounds. Alternatively, the parent’s death may illustrate to the child 
the nobility of medicine as a profession. (One can imagine how the medical 
25 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), p. 83. Indeed, it is a mark of feigned grief that the bereaved is not eudaimoni-
cally invested in the deceased’s continued existence. See Tony Milligan, “False emotions,” 
Philosophy 83 (2008): 213–230, and Troy Jollimore, “Meaningless happiness and meaning-
ful suffering,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), pp. 339–40.
26 Self-knowledge for Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 10. Thomas Attig 
defends a similar claim, arguing that grief involves “relearning” our selves, the world, and 
our relationship with the deceased (How We Grieve: Relearning the World, revised edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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circumstances of the parent’s death—whether it was prolonged or brief, 
whether the parent received adequate care, etc.—could play an especially 
prominent role here.)
My account of how grief catalyzes self-knowledge is neutral between ‘ratio-
nalistic’ conceptions of self-knowledge, in which knowledge is the product of 
rational endorsement of some attitude rather than the perception or discovery 
of some attitude,27 and other conceptions. We may see the self-knowledge in 
question as the result of efforts at justifying our practical identities, at discov-
ering our practical identities, or some combination of both. In the case de-
scribed above, of the child who followed her deceased parent into medicine, 
the conclusions regarding her chosen profession that her grief process leads 
her to affirm may rest on discoveries of emotions, values, concerns, etc. that 
temporally anteceded the pursuit of self-knowledge embedded in that process. 
But it is no less possible that the conclusions she affirms are genuinely novel, at 
odds with whatever emotions, values, concerns, etc., existed prior to the grief 
process. In many instances, the process of diagnosing our emotions, values, 
concerns, etc., will occur side by side with the critical appraisal of them. For 
emotions have a dual epistemic role, motivating us to search both for evidence 
to corroborate how the emotions represent our concerns and for evidence that 
these concerns are concerns we ought to have.28
As Cassam observes, substantial self-knowledge—knowledge of our cen-
tral evaluative attitudes, emotions, values, etc., as opposed to ‘trivial’ self- 
knowledge such as knowing that one believes that one is wearing socks – is 
difficult to attain. Grief is likely to be a particularly fruitful source of substan-
tial self-knowledge though. Given (a) that we grieve for those in whom we have 
invested our eudaimonic hopes, (b) how acutely their deaths underscore the 
contingency of our practical identities, and (c) the range of emotional respons-
es found in grief episodes, grief makes available an astonishingly wide range of 
evidence regarding who we are and what we care about. When in the course of 
grief, I become angry, I am afforded evidence regarding what I value and what 
I perceive as a threat to that value. When in the course of grief, I become de-
pressed, I am (again) afforded evidence regarding what I value and what sorts 
of losses of what I value are most acute. And so on. Grief is thus a lens on the 
complex tapestry woven from the various threads that constitute our practical 
identities. We should be thus grateful for the opportunity to grieve, for grief is 
27 See among others Gareth Evans, Varieties of Reference, J. McDowell ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. 225, and Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
28 Brady, Emotional Insight, p. 154.
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not just any occasion for self-knowledge. It represents a rare opportunity to see 
our practical identities both in detail and as a whole.
My claims regarding grief and self-knowledge should not be exaggerated. 
I claim that grief ’s causal power to upend the material assumptions around 
which our practical identities are built make it both a powerful motivator 
of and opportunity for substantial self-knowledge. I do not claim that self-
knowledge is essential to grief—that absent self-knowledge or the pursuit 
thereof, a person is not grieving. Nor do I claim that grief alone is a source 
or occasion for such self-knowledge. Indeed, other similarly disruptive events 
within personal relationships (divorce or estrangement, say) can perform the 
same normative function. That grief is a particularly potent motivator and op-
portunity for self-knowledge does not mean it has a monopoly on the means to 
self-knowledge. But I take this fact not to be a mark against my account of grief ’s 
nature or significance. Rather, this observation helps us see grief as perhaps 
the paradigm case to illustrate how our interdependence and entanglement 
with others make our practical identities dependent upon, and therefore 
emotionally vulnerable to, the fates of others. Nor do I claim that all the self-
knowledge we might attain can be attained only via grief. Indeed, grief will 
often enable us to build upon, draw out, or disentangle self-knowledge we 
already possess. For in almost every case, the bereaved embark on grief already 
having some measure of self-knowledge with respect to the deceased, knowing 
(at least in generic terms) that the deceased mattered as one’s parent, sibling, 
co-worker, etc.
Seeing self-knowledge as the distinctive good afforded by grief also indicates 
the path marked out by healthy grief episodes. As Daniel Russell points out, it 
is far from obvious that the aim of our ‘working through’ our grief should be 
to detach ourselves from the deceased loved one, as Freud maintained. On the 
contrary, grief seems healthiest when the bereaved is able to continue her at-
tachment to the deceased under the new terms necessitated by death.29 Again, 
this does not entail the cessation of the bereaved’s relationship with the de-
ceased. Our relationships to the dead continue, both emotionally and symboli-
cally. Rather, bereavement should be guided by the goal of establishing a new, 
more stable trajectory for one’s relationship with the deceased, incorporating 
the relationship’s history prior to death. In pursuing this goal, the bereaved 
person also seeks a stable conceptualization of herself and her concerns in 
light of the relationship transformed by death. The end result of grief is thus, 
29 Happiness for Humans, pp. 224–27. I therefore have reservations about Smuts’ claim 
(“Love and death: The problem of resilience”) that resilience ought to be regretted be-
cause it represents the “death of self,” if taken literally.
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as Tony Walter has put it, to fashion a “durable biography” that integrates the 
memory of the deceased individual into their practical identities.30 Substan-
tial self-knowledge, I have proposed, is the good that results from this process.
5 Too Egoistic, Too Grandiose?
I have argued that grief ’s suffering can only be understood or appraised in the 
context of the totality of emotional responses that constitute the grief process, 
and all the more, in the context of the forward-looking enterprise of defining 
one’s relationship to a deceased individual to whom one retains some form 
of attachment. All the same, Moller was correct in concluding that grief can 
go awry when it “deprives us of insight into our own condition.” For as I have 
argued, grief is a distinctive opportunity for, and motivator of, substantial self-
knowledge of our practical identities.
Before returning to Moller’s question of whether resilience in the face of 
grief merits regret, let me address some possible worries regarding the claims I 
have made about the nature of grief and its normative significance for us.
One worry is that my account of grief ’s value renders grief too self-centered. 
For as I have depicted grief, it may seem like grief does not engage with the de-
ceased in a rich way. Grief, on my account, seems solipsistic and self-absorbed, 
even if its eudaimonic aim of self-knowledge is a noble one.
In one respect, this objection is correct. For in attempting to understand 
grief, I take myself to be attempting to grasp the specifically egocentric reac-
tions the deaths of others can prompt in us. As argued in section 2, grief is a 
selective response. We grieve only the deaths of those who mattered to us in 
specific ways. Yet it is entirely compatible with others’ deaths eliciting other, 
non-egocentric responses in us. Mourning, for instance, seems to take as its 
object the deceased individual herself and the loss that her death represents 
to her. Because many others can grasp how death might represent such a loss 
to the deceased, many can mourn a person’s death, but only some can grieve 
in response to it (and some can and will do both). A nation can mourn its war 
dead, but only those with the specific eudaimonic investment in the individual 
service members can genuinely grieve their deaths.
Still, one might press this objection further, claiming that my account of 
grief removes the deceased from the heart of the grief experience. This is not 
so, however. For though I have argued that grief is directed at one’s relation-
ship with the deceased, one cannot interrogate this relationship without in 
30 “A new model of grief: Bereavement and biography.”
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some way interrogating the deceased, and discoveries and insights about the 
deceased that arise in the course of grief do not register with the bereaved 
merely as normatively inert curiosities about the deceased. Those facts are tak-
en as facts about the deceased and the bereaved, facts to be integrated into the 
bereaved individual’s understanding of their relationship, and by extension, 
into her self-understanding. This process of enhancing self-knowledge, while it 
culminates in a good to oneself, is not narcissistically focused on oneself. With-
in the grief process, bereaved individuals may not be able to cleanly distill the 
process of knowing the deceased from knowing themselves. As Samuel Schef-
fler has suggested, inasmuch as grief is a process through which individuals 
“register the extent of their dependence on, vulnerability to, and entanglement 
with other people and their fates” the “attitudinal reactions” that constitute 
grieving often cannot be readily categorized as egoistic or altruistic.31
One might instead find my account of grief ’s nature and significance too 
grandiose. What is wrong with characterizing grief more plainly, in terms of 
being sad at another’s death? I do not deny that sadness or suffering are es-
sential ingredients of grief. But to reduce grief to this sadness overlooks its 
complex emotional texture and inhibits differentiating grief from other reac-
tions we have to others’ death (mourning among them). It would be an exag-
geration to deny the possibility of a grief episode that involved only sadness, 
i.e., a grief ‘process’ with only an emotional perception or state. Nevertheless, 
grief episodes of this sort appear to be rare. And even here, such sadness can be 
informative regarding the significance of the bereaved’s relationship with the 
deceased and thus a catalyst for self-knowledge.
6 Resilience and Regret
Let us now address whether the resilience to which Moller refers should be re-
gretted. On my account, this depends upon what such resilience shows about 
whether a grief episode generates self-knowledge. And as one might antici-
pate, my own answer is complex, for there is no regular connection between 
the presence or absence of suffering associated with grief and the achievement 
of self-knowledge.
One way in which another’s death may not lead to self-knowledge is simply 
not to grieve at all. Such appears to be the reaction of Meursault, the principal 
31 Death and the Afterlife, p. 180. Donald Baxter, “Altruism, grief, and identity,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 371–83 proposes that grief calls into question the 
very distinctness of selves presupposed by the contrast between egoism and altruism.
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character in Camus’ The Stranger.32 Of course, in such cases, questions under-
standably arise as to whether such individuals are even capable of relating to 
others in such a way that grief at their deaths is an intelligible response.
Yet even those whose grief is genuine (i.e., directed at its proper object) may 
nevertheless fall short of self-knowledge. As we have seen, grief is not an af-
fectively laden perception of a singularly valenced evaluative fact. Rather, it 
is an ongoing emotional activity, characterized by multiple emotional states, 
in which the bereaved attempt to establish new terms for their relationship 
with the deceased, and in so doing, acquire self-knowledge of their own val-
ues, cares, and concerns. In the case of less complex emotions, the goods these 
emotions make available can often be readily accessed or achieved. To feel fear 
upon hearing a loud thunderclap usually leads people to be startled and to 
locate, and thereby avoid, the danger that fear registers. The relationship be-
tween an emotional activity like grief and the good it affords us is looser, how-
ever. For one, individuals will vary in their aptitudes at a given activity. We are 
not equally well-equipped with respect to the emotional discernment likely 
to be helpful in establishing new terms in our relationship with the deceased. 
Achieving self-knowledge via the process of grief may be aided by moral or 
epistemic virtues (for example, curiosity, intellectual steadfastness, or cour-
age) that are not equally distributed. Grief episodes will also vary in how trac-
table and amenable to self-knowledge they are. For those who stood in strong 
relationships with the deceased—those whose relationships were transpar-
ent and mature—grief may require little in the way of articulating the signifi-
cance of that relationship for one’s practical identity. The grief in question may 
amount to little more than missing the deceased individual. Self-knowledge 
can come easily here, with modest and relatively manageable emotional dis-
tress. For a good many others, grief may become problematic or “complicated.” 
Those whose relationship with the deceased was more troubled, or those with 
narcissistic personalities for whom the deaths of others challenges their self-
conception as independent or invulnerable,33 are likely to find the articula-
tion and eventual appreciation of the relationship in question more elusive or 
daunting. Finally, the generic difficulties of attaining knowledge (our suscepti-
bility to wishful thinking, bad inferences, etc.) are likely to plague any activity 
suited to the attainment of self-knowledge.
32 For a discussion of The Stranger as a commentary on the incapacity to grieve, see Michael 
Cholbi, “Finding the good in grief: What Augustine knew but Meursault could not,” Jour-
nal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2017): 91–105.
33 Robert Solomon, “On grief and gratitude,” p. 86.
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There are grounds for skepticism about the arduous and emotionally taxing 
“grief work” often described in contemporary clinical writings on grief. Never-
theless, my account of the nature and value of grief acknowledges that griev-
ing is effortful while acknowledging that it is not paradigmatically painstaking 
or traumatic. So depicted, grief is thus a therapeutic cum epistemic undertak-
ing. It is therapeutic not because grief is necessarily traumatic or diseased, nor 
because it often results in healing of psychological wounds. Rather, it is ‘thera-
peutic’ in the Greek sense of being a way of attending to someone, of directing 
concerted attention to the relationship death necessarily transforms, and by 
extension, to one’s one eudaimonic commitments. It is epistemic because the 
good it generates is a species of self-knowledge. This epistemic facet of grief 
helps explain the oft-noted withdrawal of the bereaved. For many, grief induc-
es a period of introspection, and on my view, such introspection represents 
part of the effort by which the bereaved seek to articulate the significance of 
the relationship recently transformed by death, and by extension, to achieve a 
greater measure of self-understanding.
We are not omnipotent with respect to our own grief, but neither are we 
pure spectators. Whether we should regret being resilient in the face of grief 
concerns as much what we do as we grieve as what happens to us during grief. 
The particular affective states that make up a grief episode strike us unbid-
den. Yet we can influence our second-order attitudes toward the justifiability 
of these states, and consider the justifiability of these states as representations 
of our relationships with the deceased, both as they were and we might want 
them to be. In so doing, we position ourselves to attain valuable self-knowledge. 
Resilience in the wake of grief is thus regrettable when we squander the oppor-
tunity to attain self-knowledge. As Williams put it, the “constitutive thought of 
regret in general” is akin to ‘how much better if it [some state of affairs] had 
been otherwise’.”34 But the regret at issue in grief is not what Williams terms 
spectator-regret, regret directed at the fact that some state of affairs has oc-
curred. Rather, the regret at issue is primarily agent-regret, regret directed at an 
outcome which one had a hand (even if only by omission) in bringing about.
7 Conclusion
Emotions make our cares and concerns salient, and so serve to disclose and 
open to scrutiny our practical identities. We should welcome the opportuni-
ty to grieve because the emotional complexity of grief makes it an especially 
34 “Moral luck,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1976), 123.
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fertile source of self-knowledge and self-understanding. And we should only 
regret the resilience often shown in the face of grief if and because such resil-
ience marks the cessation of grieving that failed to yield self-knowledge.
That said, those who do not grieve, who quasi-grieve, or who grieve 
without attaining further self-knowledge do not undergo a state that is intrinsi-
cally bad, affectively or otherwise. Their loss is a comparative one. Their lives 
are less good than they could have been. Of course, this assumes that self-
knowledge is good, a claim about which philosophers have said surprisingly 
little and which must wait for another occasion.35
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